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Introduction: investment and growth is crucial for recovery   
 
Afghanistan faces at present a serious economic challenge: a decade of massive aid 
inflow has distorted the economy and economic policy-making. The looming decrease 
in aid levels over the next few years could augment political instability and cause a 
reduction in growth. While there may be immediate positive impacts associated with 
individual aid projects, indirectly, as this report will illustrate below, the total aid 
inflow may hurt the prospects for long-term economic recovery.  
  
Afghanistan’s predicament illustrates a wider problem associated with recovery in 
fragile states. This group of countries receives a large share of global aid flows. The 
global commitment to continuing the support to fragile states is also high, as 
demonstrated at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan.1 However, 
economic analysis also tells us that the link between aid and economic growth is weak, 
and aid levels over a certain percentage of GDP may be detrimental to growth.2  This 
is of serious concern to fragile states since their aid levels in relation to GDP tend to be 
high. Moreover, their absorptive capacity of aid is often low, due to the havoc waged 
on governing institutions during the conflict years.   
 
This report argues that fragile states are best served with a mix of aid and foreign 
direct investments (FDI), since FDI can help create a long-term fundament for growth. 
However, fragility discourages investment and the bulk of FDI often comes well after 
a country has stabilised. The key question for fragile states is how FDI can come 
earlier and how its larger development effect may best be nourished. This report 
discusses these challenges and assesses how Norfund may contribute.  
 
The report is particularly concerned with FDI in fragile states that are recovering from 
armed conflict, but will also refer to states facing related challenges, such as that of a 
difficult political transition in countries like Myanmar. 
 
                                                        
1
  Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, Busan Republic of Korea, 29 November – 1 
December 2011 
2
 Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler ‘High-value natural resources, development and conflict: channels of 
causation', in P Lujala and S. A. Rustad eds. High-value natural resources and peacebuilding (London: 
earthscan) 2012, Collier, Paul Post-conflict recovery: how should strategies be distinctive? Journal of African 
Economies vol 18, AERC Supplement 2009  
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War is typically looked at as a time of despair, destruction and insecurity. Certainly, 
the loss of life and dignity in war must never be underplayed. Neither the 
developmental backlash nor loss of productive assets should be ignored. However, war 
also has a number of creative elements that must be recognised and built on. David 
Keen defines war as an alternative system of power, profit and protection.3  While war 
includes two or more sides fighting over political goals, the war years are also 
signified by old and new powerbrokers asserting control over economic sectors and 
entrepreneurs taking advantage of opportunities that come in the wake of war.4   
 
Using these observations as starting points we can recognise that war creates a distinct 
set of assets and opportunities. Participation in an armed group may bring important 
social capital to combatants and commanders: they enlarge their networks, travel more 
widely and acquire new skills. Refugees and migrants form diaspora communities that 
acquire new knowledge and gain better access to global resources such as education 
and investment. Moreover, as Paul Collier notes, states emerging from conflict often 
experience a commodity export boom. The end of conflict allows for an intensification 
of economic activity that produces a ‘quantity windfall’ (see page 12). This may 
pertain to natural resources, industry and agriculture alike. In the agricultural sector 
farmers re-emerge from subsistence farming and turn to export commodities, while in 
the extractive industries planned exploration from the pre-war years may finally be 
commenced and export volumes enlarged. 5  
 
These are signs that the post-war moment is one of both great fortune as well as 
despair. The role of outside investors is to identify the positive elements vested in 
post-war economies and magnify their potentials and effect. As the peacebuilding 
scholars Mats Berdal and Nader Mousavizadeh note ‘encouraging and building on (..) 
local ingenuity in a way that avoids the reproduction of violent political economies is 
the most promising route to economic recovery and both the domestic and foreign 
private sector can play an important role.’ 6   The crucial importance of economic 
recovery, moreover, for guarding the peace should not be underplayed. Growth in the 
                                                        
3
 Keen David ‘Incentives and disincentives for violence’ in Berdal and Malone eds. Greed and grievance: 
economic agendas in civil wars. (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers) 2000. 
4
 Jonathan Goodhand identifies ‘combat economies’, ‘shadow economies’ and ‘coping economies’ as typical 
forms of economic activities that appear during war.  
5
 Collier, Paul Post-conflict recovery: how should strategies be distinctive? Journal of African Economies vol 18, 
AERC Supplement 2009 
6
 Berdal, Mats and Nader Mousavizadeh Investing for peace: the private sector and the challenges of 
peacebuilding Survival 52:2, 2010 p. 43 
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first post-conflict decade significantly reduces the risk of instability.7 Conversely, in 
studies of the situation in Africa the risk of civil war correlates strongly with low 
economic growth.8    
 
In the following the report discusses three key features of fragile states: instability, 
distorted economy and weak institutions. The report then turns to an assessment of key 
trends associated with FDI in fragile states. Distinct challenges and opportunities 
related to FDI are also debated. The report ends with a section assessing how Norfund 
can navigate the particular challenges that fragile states pose. It concludes by noting 
that a rethink of how support to fragile states is best done is well underway, triggered 
in part by failures in Afghanistan. Issues of growth and investment are key ingredients 
in the new paths that are forged and Norfund is well positioned to contribute.  
 
  
                                                        
7
 Collier, Paul Post-conflict recovery: how should strategies be distinctive? Journal of African Economies vol 18, 
AERC Supplement 2009 
8
 Ibid.  
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Fragile states: weak institutions and distorted economy   
 
Countries falling into the category ‘fragile states’ form a heterogeneous group.  
In this report we focus on the Asian and African countries listed on the World Bank 
Harmonized List of Fragile Situations.9 The heterogeneity of fragile states call for a 
cautious approach when attempting to identify common trends. Three overarching 
challenges may nevertheless be identified. Needless to say, this is not intended as an 
exhaustive list or comprehensive discussion, but represents an attempt to single out 
some central aspects that may be relevant for the later assessment of the role of FDI in 
fragile states. 
 
Insecurity and political tensions 
 
Post-war settings are profoundly insecure. Countries that have endured civil war are 
more likely to experience a new onset of conflict: a report from 2004 finds that around 
half of all post-conflict countries relapse into conflict within a decade.10 Moreover, 
even if there is a formal end to war, violence rates typically continue to be high. A 
historical study of violence for the period 1900 to 1976 found that societies were 
overall considerably more violent than before the war, in many cases homicide rates 
doubled.11  This phenomenon has also appeared in many of the countries in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia suffering from civil war in the 1990s and onwards. Central 
American countries were especially hard hit, with a state like El Salvador having four 
times higher homicide rates than before the war. Astri Suhrke notes that ethically-
directed violence erupted in Kosovo and Northern Afghanistan after the NATO 
invasions had established a new order in these areas. In Liberia rebels forcefully took 
control over rubber plantations after the end to the war and East Timor experienced a 
severe episode of violence seven years after the secession from Indonesia when the 
police and army fought each other.12    
 
                                                        
9
 The African and Asian states on the list are Afghanistan, Angola , Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
DRC, Congo, Republic of, Cote D'ivoire, Eritrea, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, Sierra Leone,  Somalia South 
Sudan, Sudan, Timor-Leste (www.worldbank.org)  
10
 Collier, Paul Development and Conflict, Oxford University, 2004  
11
 Suhrke, Astri ‘Peace in between’ in Suhrke and Berdal eds. Peace in between: post-war violence and 
peacebuilding (London: Routledge) 2011 p. 1-2. 
12Ibid. There are of course exceptions to this, the post-civil war period in Tajikistan was by and large marked by 
exceptionally low levels of violence, see Torjesen, Stina and S. Neil MacFarlane, ‘R before D: the case of post 
conflict reintegration in Tajikistan’, Journal of Conflict, Security and Development Vol 7, no.2 June 
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There is also often a regional dimension to civil wars and an unstable regional 
neighbourhood may drive insecurity in states attempting to recover from conflict. An 
unstable regional context may allow for spill over of weapons and mercenaries or 
political, economic or security interest may motivate regional actors to engage in 
conflict ridden countries. At the very least this adds tension to a fragile environment, 
in the worst case it may trigger a relapse back into civil war.13     
 
Post-war settings are riddled with political tensions. A number of countries need to 
deal with ‘spoilers’ of peace, disgruntled armed sub-factions that are unhappy with the 
peace settlement and try, often through violent means and political rhetoric, to carve 
out a larger role.14 This comes at a time when the international community push for 
democratisation and market reform. In a seminal study from 2004 Roland Paris found 
that the emphasis on early elections in the absence of well functioning institutions 
increased, rather than decreased instability.15  
 
Political tensions may in a part stem from deep grievances fought out in the conflict 
years, such as deep disagreements on the nature of the state (i.e. the Maoists vs. the 
government in Nepal). These are disagreements that may not be fully resolved with the 
peace settlement and may continue to shape political struggles in the post-conflict 
years. Alternatively, political tensions may reflect greed driven agendas of civil war 
actors.  In the war years as well as the post-war period violent entrepreneurs and 
strongmen may be driven by economic motivations. If the post-war settlement fails to 
deliver tangible rewards, this could cause tensions. The rebel movement M23 currently 
operating in Eastern Congo, illustrates this phenomenon. Disgruntled with the meagre 
share of the post-war ‘pie’ of economic privileges and benefits the group is rebelling 
against the government and triggering considerable political tension.16    
  
Distorted economy  
 
Conflict ridden states face a number of economic challenges. GDP drops significantly 
in the war years and many commercial activities break down, including industrial 
                                                        
13
 Gleditch, Kristian Skrede, ‘Transnational dimensions of civil war’, Journal of Peace Research, vol 44, no 3. 
May 2007  
14
  Stedman, Stephen J. ‘Spoiler problems in peace processes’ International Security, vol 22, no 2, 1997   
15
 Paris, Roland At war’s end: building peace after conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 2004 
16
 Washington Post ‘M23 rebels return to peace talks’ December 11, 2012   
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production.17 With insecurity and disruptions in supply and demand many farmers 
revert into subsistence farming and agricultural production contracts. Capital flight is a 
considerable problem in low-income countries, and is likely to be even more severe 
for countries suffering from armed conflict. Public spending is diverted towards 
military and security ends and formal revenues collection drops significantly. 18 
Informal and illicit economic activities, such as smuggling expand, creating 
considerable fortunes for a select few and a broader tradition for circumventing state 
regulation and control. These indigenous features make economic recovery difficult. 
Arguably, however, a large outside involvement, add to the macro-economic 
challenges facing a post-war country.  There is increasing evidence that countries have 
a ‘saturation point’ for when the effect of aid on growth becomes negative. One study 
found that in countries where governance and policy making processes worked well 
aid contributed to growth if it was no more than 30 percent of GDP. In countries where 
policies were poor the saturation point of aid came at 10 to 15 percent of GDP.19 The 
reasons for the potential negative effect of large aid volumes are both economic and 
political.  
 
In economic terms, aid inflows represent additional revenues for countries and their 
inflows raise the exchange rate, thereby potentially hurting export sectors, including 
manufacturing (‘Dutch disease’). The aid-fuelled sectors also drive up salary levels 
and draw the most skilled and talented workers away from the government or local 
private sector (brain drain and ‘carving out’).  
 
In political terms, the additional revenue associated with aid runs the risk of 
‘detaching’ the government from the electorate, largely because taxation becomes less 
important. Deborah A. Brautigam and Stephen Knack note that ‘when revenues do not 
depend on the taxes raised from citizens and businesses, there is less incentive to for 
government to be accountable to them’.20 A less accountable government will likely be 
                                                        
17
 Collier, Paul Post-Conflict Economic Recovery, International Peace Academy 2006. Collier also estimates that 
GDP is typically reduced by around 15 percent in the war years, se Collier, Paul ‘Post-conflict recovery: how 
should strategies be distinctive?’ Journal of African Economies vol 18, AERC Supplement 2009 
18
 Collier, Paul Post-Conflict Economic Recovery, International Peace Academy 2006 
19
 Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler ‘High-value natural resources, development and conflict: channels of 
causation', in P Lujala and S. A. Rustad eds. High-value natural resources and peacebuilding (London: 
earthscan) 2012 
20
 Brautigam Deborah A. and Stephen Knack Foreign aid, institutions, and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change Vol 52 no 2, 2004, p. 265, This resonates with the findings of who 
found that the larger the share of government expenditures financed through taxation the more likely the 
government was to become representative, Ross, Michael L. ‘Does taxation lead to representation?’ British 
Journal of Political Science, 32, 2004 
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less able to develop economic policies that serve larger national interests and it may 
turn to policies that serve narrow private ends, thus decreasing the prospects for 
growth and recovery. This ties inn with the concept of rent seeking, which denotes 
efforts to use government mechanisms to access wealth or economic privilege without 
contributing to new wealth. 21   By way of example, Stephanie Mattie traces how 
practices of rent-seeking evolved in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from 
1965 and onwards.  She notes that President Mobutu used the state finances to buy 
support from the Congolese elite. Mobuto drew on resources stemming from mineral 
wealth, while in in recent years Mattie argues that the inflow of foreign aid has 
allowed current Congolese authorities to continue these practices. Foreign aid has also 
allowed spending to remain high, while domestic revenues generation is low. She 
notes that authorities have not taken any concerted efforts to create a comprehensive 
taxation system.22  
 
 
                                                        
21
 Conybeare, John A. C. ‘The Rent-Seeking State & Revenue Diversification’ World Politics, vol 35, 1, 1982   
22
 Stephanie Mattie ‘Resources and rent seeking in the Deomcratic Republic of the Congo’ Third World 
Quarterly, Vol 31  no 3, 2010  
The Afghan economy: aid overflow contributes to insecurity  
 
Aid to Afghanistan spiked after the fall of the Taleban in 2001 (see figure 2: FDI vs. ODA in Afghanistan, Sierra 
Leone and Timor-Leste). By 2009 Afghanistan received the highest rates of development assistance of any 
developing country in recent history. Aid also constitutes an exceptionally high share of the economy. 
Afghanistan’s GDP in 2011-2012 is estimated to be around 18 billion USD, while total aid expenditure is around 
15 billion USD. This raises two macro-economic concerns. First, the level of aid is well above the rates deemed 
sound by Paul Collier (10-30 percent of GDP), and may prove to be detrimental to growth and recovery. Second, 
there is considerable uncertainty tied to the level and volatility of aid in the years to come. Indeed, the level of 
aid is expected to be reduced significantly as the NATO military engagement draws down in 2013-2014. The 
reduction may hurt the economy and create additional uncertainty at a time when Afghanistan needs to face the 
military threat from the Taleban on its own and manage a transfer of power in the presidential and parliamentary 
elections in 2014 and 2015.  
 
In addition to these macro-economic worries, the aid inflow has created a number of unintended consequences at 
the community level. Stephen A. Zysk notes that much of the aid has been channelled toward the insecure areas 
in the east and south, in efforts to provide incentives for peace. In fact, Zysk argues, these measures have 
backfired in two ways. Aid has contributed to negative governance outcomes, such as increases in corruption, 
and this has alienated rather than build support for the Afghan state among the Afghan population. Moreover, as 
much as 10 to 20 percent of the reconstruction and development financing in the insecure southern and eastern 
regions may have gone to insurgents and their intermediaries as part of protection rackets, thus providing 
financing and incentives for continued fighting. Taken together these macro and mico-level features associated 
with the inflow of aid give grounds for profound concern over how the overall reconstruction efforts in 
Afghanistan have been managed. In an in-dept survey of the ten-year long Western engagement in Afghanistan, 
Astri Suhrke finds that the intervention has suffered from a number of deep structural contradictions. One was 
the near impossibility of helping to develop a self-sufficient and competent state able to generate its own 
revenues when external aid money was lavished on all government sectors. An other structural contradiction was 
the difficulties of assisting the emergence an independent government machinery when the international 
development and military engagement, even if stressing the virtues of ‘afghan ownership’, was bent towards 
maintaining considerable degrees of control, especially over spending. These and other profound contradictions 
made it impossible, Suhrke concludes, for the international military and civilian missions to succeed in its effort 
to build a stable, peaceful and prosperous state.  
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Weak institutions  
 
The key government institutions that are tasked with managing the transition from war 
to peace are often severely weakened after war or their historic malfunctioning before 
the war may in some cases have contributed to the onset of conflict.23 This feature has 
triggered a profound interest on the part of outside actors (i.e. United Nations, World 
Bank) seeking to assist with stabilisation and recovery in war-torn states as to how 
institutions can be rebuilt. Indeed, the overarching doctrine for outside engagement in 
fragile states is usually described as ‘peacebuilding’ or ‘statebuilding’. The end goal of 
these approaches are presented as the strengthening and transformation formal 
institutions (including the constitution, political system, macro-economic 
management, justice sector and security services) in such a way that they address 
grievances that may have fuelled conflict and guard against future instability. 
 
The promise and peril of large-scale attempts to strengthen institutions under the 
auspices of the statebuilding doctrine have been extensively debated. 24  It falls, 
however, well outside the remit of this report to do a stocktaking for these effort. In 
the context of a discussion of FDI it may suffice to merely highlight three features of 
the institutional set-up in fragile states that may be particularly challenging.  
 
First, legal frameworks and regulatory procedures may be highly cumbersome or even 
defunct. This may include uncertainty over property rights, including which registries 
or traditions are in use and how transfers of ownership should be done. Second, the 
capacity of government staff may be weak due to disruption in education systems, 
outward migration and local brain drain (see section above).  
 
Third, institutions may be subject to undue pressure from informal actors. Christine 
Cheng notes that post-war governments are often over-powered by informal actors that 
draw their strengths from war-time networks and activities. These may be elite 
individuals tided to security, crime or economic activities during the war years. Cheng 
argues that these actors can draw on their networks, access financial capital and insider 
information so as to fix rules, regulations and processes in their own favour. She 
concludes that ‘the exceptional malleability of a post-conflict government’s 
                                                        
23
 While this is often the case there are notable exceptions, Christine Cheng mentions Uganda and Sri Lanka  
24
 see Berdal, Mats and Dominik Zaum eds Political Economy of Statebuilding: power after peace (London: 
Routledge) 2012   
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institutions means that informal actors have an opportunity to shape the political and 
economic realms in ways that provide substantial private benefit to informal actors, 
often at the expense of the public interest’.25      
 
With these predictions of weak institutions and failing governing capacity it comes as 
little surprise that fragile states perform badly on global rankings for corruptions and 
ease of doing business. Indeed fragile states are overwhelmingly placed at the very 
lowest end of these rankings.26 Needless to say this it considerably more challenging to 
succeed with transparent and formal investments.     
 
 
Challenges and opportunities with investing in fragile states  
 
In the above section I outlined key challenges facing post-conflict states. Given these 
profound problems is it advisable to argue for increased FDI into such settings? Mats 
Berdal and Nader Mousavizadeh note that the debate about investments in fragile 
states have long been polarised. On the one hand ‘market fundamentalists’ argued, 
particularly in the 1990s, for an overreliance on market actors to address social 
challenges, including those facing post-conflict societies. 27   On the other hand, 
arguments have been put forward that there can be no role for the private sector in 
post-conflict settings because market actors searching for quick profits are likely to 
fuel rather than mitigate conflict. They will feed into and reinforce exploitative and 
predatory war economies that have evolved in the course of conflict.28 Berdal and 
Mousavizadeh note, however, that neither extreme view are helpful and argue for a 
new understanding of the role of business in fragile settings.   
 
This section builds on Berdal and Mousavizadeh’s perspectives and discusses 
challenges and opportunities associated with investments in fragile states. First, 
however, it provides an outline of general trends related to aid and investments in 
these settings.  
                                                        
25
 Cheng, Christine, ‘Private and public interests: informal actors, informal influence and economic order after 
war’ in Berdal, Mats and Dominik Zaum eds Political Economy of Statebuilding: power after peace (London: 
Routledge) 2012 p. 77   
26
 Transparency International, Corruption perception index 2012 (http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/  
and World Bank Doing business: measuring business regulations, 2012 
(http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings) 
27
 Berdal, Mats and Nader Mousavizadeh Investing for peace: the private sector and the challenges of 
peacebuilding Survival 52:2, 2010, p. 37-38,  
28
 Ibid p. 38  
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Trends  
 
In the introduction to this report it was noted that FDI investments tend to come late 
and well after the end of the conflict.  There is also a striking gap between the level of 
aid, which tend to be high, and levels of FDI, which tend to be low.    
 
A compilation of statistics undertaken by the University of Agder for this report 
indicates that the size of aid in fragile states vastly outstrips that of FDI in the first five 
years after the formal end to conflict aid. In the figure (1) below we see that FDI has 
an increase just after the formal end to conflict, but overall remain low in the first five 
years.   
 
 
Figure 1: FDI and ODA in 12 fragile countries, year 0-5 after conflict (million USD)29  
 
 
 
Moreover, a look at patterns in individual countries indicates the tendencies for FDI to 
come late. In Afghanistan FDI levels continue to remain markedly low, while in Timor 
Leste some FDI appears after year six. Sierra Leone saw an increase in the third year 
after the peace agreement was forged.  
 
  
                                                        
29
 The countries surveyed are Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Demo rep Congo, Rep. Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Eritrea, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Timor-Leste. Data is drawn from the World Bank and OECD 
DAC databases.   
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Figure 2: FDI vs ODA in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste (year 0-10 after 
conflict) 
  
Afghanistan post conflict  
ODA vs FDI 
Sierra Leone post conflict  
ODA vs FDI 
Timor-Leste post conflict  
ODA vs FDI 
   
   
 
These patterns mirrors John Bray’s survey of the situation in Bosnia Herzegovina. FDI 
have been substantial, but again, strikingly absent in the first post-war years. Bray’s 
overview shows that FDI is absent in the early years after the Dayton peace agreement 
in 1995, low in years up to 2004, but begin to pick up after that.  
 
 
Figure 3: ODA vs FDI in Bosnia Herzegovina (million USD)30 
 
 
 
                                                        
30
 Amounts are for million USD.  Figure draws on presentation in Bray, John ‘The role of private sector actors in 
post-conflict recovery’ Conflict, security and development vol 9, 1, 2009. Bray uses data sets European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and OECD.   
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There are few readily available and comprehensive breakdowns of the sectors that 
draw FDI in fragile states. John Bray, however, notes that among the early movers one 
typically find mobile phone operators, construction companies, transport and logistic 
providers and petroleum and mining companies. 
 
In an assessment of Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) investment, the World 
Bank found a similar pattern in terms of the initial slowness of investment and a bias 
towards telecommunications.   
 
 
Figure 4: PPI by sector31 
 
 
 
 
A final trend to note is the difference in types of foreign direct investors in fragile 
states. One important category is the diaspora investors, businessmen that hail from 
the country but are well established abroad. Regional companies operating out of more 
prosperous neighbouring countries (typically Austrian firms in the Balkans or Turkish 
firms in Afghanistan) are also important early movers. Finally, large multinational 
                                                        
31
 Figures taken from Schwartz Jordan, Shelly Hahn and Ian Bannon The private sector’s role in the provision of 
infrastructure in post-conflict countries: patterns and policy options (Washington: World Bank) August 2004  
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companies also operate in some fragile countries, although, as John Bray notes, truly 
global companies are unlikely to take the risk of investing in small and dangerous 
markets and will leave these opportunities for smaller regional or international players 
to exploit. The exception is if they identify truly ‘global’ opportunities, such as large 
oil reserves.32      
 
Overall, the surveys indicate an overreliance on aid, strikingly low level of FDI and a 
likely bias towards distinct sectors such as telecommunications and extractive 
industries. It follows that FDI should come earlier, in larger portions and serve as a 
better compliment aid flows. Moreover fragile states are in need of much larger and 
considerably more diverse inflows of investment than have hereto been the case.   
 
Opportunities  
 
Above this report outlined three key features of fragile states: insecurity, political 
instability, distorted economy and weak institutions. These hamper development and 
also serve as severe barriers to FDI. Indeed, explaining why there is an absence of FDI 
in fragile states does not seem to be difficult. However, is it possible to identify 
distinct opportunities and pull factors related to FDI in fragile states?  
 
Overall, more ‘normal’ pull-factors will likely be in play in relation to investments in 
fragile states. Peter Dicken note growing markets, natural resources and cheap labour 
as important standard pull factors.33 These are certainly present in many fragile states.  
 
In addition however, Paul Collier assess particular assets that we may expect to find in 
society emerging from conflict. Collier identifies three sectors which, in a post-conflict 
period, are both promising and in great need of outside investments.34 First, investment 
in infrastructure should be recognised as a major economic opportunity with high 
returns. Collier notes that it is particularly roads, ports and powers that have the 
greatest needs and where the knock-on effects on larger development may be 
substantial. Associated with this is, as second opportunity, the likelihood of a 
                                                        
32
 Bray, John ‘The role of private sector actors in post-conflict recovery’ Conflict, security and development vol 
9, 1, 2009 p .6-7  
33
 Dicken, Peter Global Shift: Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 21st Century. 
(London: Sage) 2003 
34
 See also Moloo, Rahim and Alex Khachaturian ‘Foreign investment in a post-conflict environment’, Journal 
of world investment and trade vol 10, 3 
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construction boom in the post-conflict years. Indeed, Collier predicts that there often 
comes a sharp increase in demand for construction services, but that this coincides 
with limited capacity in the construction sector, producing, in turn, a rise of prices in 
the construction services. By way of example, the cost of constructing a school in 
Liberia doubled a year after the new credible government took office. Collier 
encourages firms to build local capacity in construction, target key bottlenecks 
(shortages of equipment and skills) and bring in outside expertise. Third, Collier notes 
that post-conflict states experience a ‘quantity windfall’ in the commodities sectors, 
due to the inactivity of the war years. Natural resources, such as mining and oil 
extraction are examples of sectors where new assets can be accessed (see discussion 
below). But as important is the ‘quantity windfall’ in agriculture. Collier notes 
production for export agriculture drops during war year as peasant farmers retreat into 
subsistence farming. These sectors (i.e. coffee, tea and cocoa) are, however, easily 
revived after war. It follows that outside investments into agribusiness will likely have 
good prospects.35     
    
Transparent business practices as positive contributions 
 
Clearly, increased outside investments into the productive sectors discussed above 
could prove both profitable for the investors and hold great development effect for a 
receiving country. However, this argument hinges on an understanding of the role of 
business in fragile states as positive.  
 
C.K Prahald presented in 2004 a forceful argument for the potential virtues associated 
international commercial players operating in development settings. Essentially 
Prahald argued that the there were 4-5 billion consumers globally ‘at the bottom of the 
pyramid’ that were unserved by the formal private sector, including by multinational 
companies. Prahald argued that not only did this market segment constitute a major 
business opportunity for companies. He also argued that the product and services of 
large companies, when made available to the lower segments, were vastly more 
preferable to poor consumers because they were less likely to involve ‘local 
monopolies, inadequate access, poor distribution and strong traditional intermediaries’ 
                                                        
35
 Collier, Paul Post-conflict recovery: how should strategies be distinctive? Journal of African Economies vol 
18, AERC Supplement 2009   
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which imposed ‘poverty penalties’ when offering goods and services to the poor.36 
Involvement of large private sector players could increase competition. These 
companies were also well positioned to increase government transparency and 
impartial enforcement of rules, thereby improving business climate and lessening the 
entrenched power of local elites.   
 
Mats Berdal and Nader Mousavizadeh echo Prahalad’s argument in relation to fragile 
states. They find in their interview material that among government officials and 
investors there is an ‘increasing understanding of the fundamental development 
benefits of having foreign investors enter these markets on openly commercial terms 
freely entered into by both sides within a robust, transparent and accountable legal 
framework’.37 In this way the way of doing business, if conducted in a transparent and 
appropriate manner, could have clear signalling effects and contribute to improved 
governance and business conduct. This is of no minor importance to fragile states, 
given, as discussed above, that weak institutions is a key feature.  
 
Reform and investment trigger recovery in Mozambique  
 
Mozambique emerged from a long-fought and destructive civil war in 1992. It was, and remains, one of the poorest nations in Africa, but its 
economic prospects are highly promising.38 Investments and the role of business in the run up to the peace agreement and afterwards have 
been considerable. Alex Vines documents how the UK multinational Lonrho got deeply involved with the conflicting parties during the war 
years. Lonrho built and managed an oil pipeline in Mozambique and was forced to pay protection fees to the insurgent group Renamo 
(around 5 million USD transferred over a ten year period).39 However, Lonrho also became a significant player in efforts to get a negotiated 
peace settlement. Lonrho provided a number of financial incentives in the negotiations and made company assets, such as the company jet, 
available for participants in the negotiation efforts. Vines argues that the efforts of Lonrho significantly shaped the nature of the negotiations, 
and that the role of business in bringing about peace in Mozambique must not be underplayed.40  
 
Mozambique’s post war recovery has been shaped by early economic reform (some initiated during the conflict in the late 1980s) and 
aggressive efforts to increase outside investment, including from neighbouring South Africa. This has resulted in the establishment of a 
number of ‘mega projects’, chief among which is the 1.3 billion USD aluminium plant MOZAL.41 Construction of the plan started in 1998, 
only six years after the peace agreement, and was completed in two years. Considerable investment and future export revenues are expected 
from coal and off-shore gas development. Tax and customs systems have been reformed and revenues are increasing. Mozambique is still 
one of the largest aid recipients in Africa, but level of aid to GDP is still well under 10 percent of GDP.42     
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Challenges  
 
It follows from the discussion above that the investments flows as well as the type of 
business conduct can have significant development effects and positively support post-
conflict growth and recovery. However, it is important to stress that this assertion is 
open to empirical investigation. The potential for positive contributions by business is 
beyond contestation, however, the actual conduct and impact of business behaviours in 
fragile states so far may still constitute a mixed track record.  
 
This section highlights some of the major problems that have surfaced in relation to 
FDI in fragile states and identifies some specific challenges facing businesses.    
 
Two debates have shaped how the role of business in fragile societies is understood: 
the resource curse and writings on the economic agendas in civil wars. Both debates 
have been touched on already in this report, but briefly the ‘resource curse’ theory 
finds that countries with an abundance of natural resources (especially minerals and 
oil) have less growth and development than other similar countries with less resources 
available.43A variant of this also finds that countries with a reliance on export of 
natural resources are at greater risk of conflict.44 Writings on economic agendas in 
civil wars have indicated that the prospect of economic gain, especially control over 
natural resources, have fuelled fighting in war torn countries. This has put 
international companies under considerable scrutiny. Have the kind of contracts 
international companies have forged with fragile states privileged the few and been 
detrimental to development? Or have the activities of international companies fuelled 
the (profit) motivations of the belligerents in civil war by helping to provide resources 
or services that could be used to prolong the fighting? A UN report by a Panel of 
Experts found for example that international firms in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo had been involved in large-scale looting of timber and minerals during the war 
years, and that this in turn had offered substantial illegal benefits to armed factions and 
their leaders.45  
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These theoretical perspectives and empirical findings point to the need for 
considerable caution on the part of foreign investors when engaging in fragile states, in 
particular in extractive industries. Clearly a number of investments have turned out 
wrong. The massive attention to the extractive sectors and the role of national and 
international companies in them, is also a sign of a problematic bias: fragile states are 
better able to attract outside investors in extractive sectors than other sectors where 
quick profits are not so readily available. This is a powerful argument for the need for 
diversification in these countries.   
 
It could also be that investments in other more complex commercial sectors are less 
likely to bring on the same negative effects that many investments in the natural 
resource sectors caused in the 1990s and early 2000s. Still, some challenges will not 
be confined to the natural resource sectors and call for caution. One example is the use 
of private security providers to guard commercial activities in areas where there is still 
unrest or insecurity. In Afghanistan, the extensive use of private security contractors 
have meant that many ex-combatants have not disarmed, but simply taken up new 
security related tasks in the new security firms, many of which are controlled by old 
war-time strongmen or warlords. This ensure that fighters can be easily mobilised in 
the future, while tacit political games of strength, security and protection continue with 
unrelenting strength. This undermines the monopoly of violence that Afghan security 
forces are hoping to obtain and it stalls the development of the Afghan state.46    
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Chad: oil as a catalyst of conflict  
 
A consortium of Exxon, Shell and Chevron (later replaced by Elf Aquitaine) signed an exploration treaty with 
the government of Chad in 1988. The consortium was criticised, however, by NGOs for pushing through an 
‘abusive’ contract with few of the potential profits going to Chad. In an effort to deflect criticism and also guard 
against expropriation and potential erratic behaviour on the part of the government, the consortium invited the 
World Bank to act as an intermediary. The World Bank recognised this as an opportunity to ensure that potential 
new resource wealth be used for pro-poor purposes and to demonstrate that the ‘resource curse’ could be 
overcome if the right legal frameworks were created. Chad passed, after lengthy negotiations with the World 
Bank, a Petroleum Revenue Management Law, which stipulated in detail how oil revenues were to be spent and 
created an oversight committee.  The World Bank was also particularly concerned that the revenues would be 
shared equitably socially and regionally, so as to reduce the potential for conflict in a country with a tense 
political situation.  
 
However, in an in-depth assessment of the World Bank’s efforts John A. Gould and Matthew S Winters find that 
it was unable to overcome Chad’s heritage of illiberal politics, patronage politics and conflict. They note that 
‘between 2000 and 2006, President Deby reshaped the Bank’s broad revenue distribution scheme to meet his 
own political needs’.47 The president also systematically undermined the power of the new oversight bodies and 
avoided accountability. Profits were used to strengthen the security apparatus and buy support. Wealthy 
politically connected supporters, mostly from one region, siphoned wealth from public projects and demanded 
side deals in exchange for political support. As wealth benefitted some but not others it fuelled resentment. 
Violent conflict erupted in 2003 and lingered in different forms, partly interwoven with conflicts in neighbouring 
Sudan (Darfur) in the following years. Between 2000 and 2009 Chad’s military spending rose from14 billion 
USD to 315 million USD in 2009. Gould and Winter stress in their assessment that foreign investments in oil did 
not cause the conflicts in Chad, nor were they the reason for the malfunctioning of the Chadian government. 
‘Oil, did however, shape both conflict and governance in mutually reinforcing and ultimately destructive ways. 
In particular the pattern of armed conflict in Chad demonstrates how oil revenues can build up the military 
capacity of the state while undermining the consolidation of political institutions’.48     
 
This section has presented some key trends, challenges and opportunities related to 
FDI. It has also presented three different trajectories of how outside engagement has 
played out in Chad, Mozambique and Afghanistan. Taken together the material 
highlights how difficult it is to get outside engagement right. Chad demonstrates that 
flawed institutions are difficult to mend and easily subverts well-indented plans. 
Afghanistan is a case where aid overspending seems to have generated adverse 
outcomes and hurt prospects for long-term stability and indigenous growth.  
Mozambique underlines how conflict entrenches poverty, but still highlights the 
potential positive role of business during and after conflict.    
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The overview gives ground for concern. It may nevertheless be, that, actors working 
with the private sector are well placed to deal with some of the key challenges raised. 
The next section discussed Norfund’s potential contributions.  
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Norfund’s role: early and diversified investments in fragile states 
 
Norfund establishes and develops profitable and viable enterprises in developing 
counties. Its mandate is to provide capital to poor countries beyond what would 
happen in the market place and to serve as a catalyst. By demonstrating profitability in 
its portfolio and by seeking partnership with other investors Norfund generates 
additional capital.49 A significant share of Norfund’s investments goes to the least 
developed countries (LDCs) and it has opened up for engaging in the fragile states 
South-Sudan and Myanmar. 50    
 
Norfund’s increased attention and engagement with fragile states is a welcome 
development. One of the key messages of this report is that more investment is badly 
needed in fragile states and that greater diversification, away from the predominance 
of extractive industries, and towards a broader spectrum of potentially vibrant post-
war economic activity may strengthen post-war growth and stability. Moreover, it is in 
particular in the early years after a peace settlement has been forged that available 
capital is low. Norfund’s catalytic engagement, whereby it mobilises capital from 
several sources, could have considerable positive impact, especially if it helps address 
the need for investment in the early years after conflict ends.    
 
Fragile states are, however, as this report has highlighted, challenging environments in 
which to do business.  Below we discuss particular constraints and opportunities 
facing Norfund in relation to the three key features of fragile states: instability, 
distorted economy and weak institutions.  
 
Insecurity and political tensions 
 
Norfund is already engaged in a number of projects with high risks. Investing in 
fragile states will increase risk levels even further, but the institution has demonstrated 
an ability to handle risk and create profits in difficult environment. The high risk levels 
increases the importance of country specific knowledge and ability to monitor political 
as well as economic development. Continuing Norfund’s tradition of hiring staff with 
in-depth regional knowledge will thus be important.   
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Moreover, the Norwegian government, Norfund’s owner, should continue to be 
involved in the decisions to move into fragile states and be encouraged to provide 
extra guarantees on investments. This will make the risk-levels in fragile settings more 
tolerable for Norfund, and encourage broader engagement.   
 
 
South Sudan: early investment from Norfund contributes to diversification   
 
South Sudan gained its independence in 2011 but has continued to face a number of political and economic 
challenges. Sustained disagreement with Sudan over border delineation and oil transit caused a shut down in oil 
production in 2012 that severely strained the economy. The Economist Intelligence Unit estimates that GDP fell 
by 55 percent because of the cessation in oil production.51  This highlights South Sudan’s heavy dependence on 
oil revenues: oil accounts for 98 percent of government income (excluding aid).  
 
South Sudan’s predicament is in many ways one typical of fragile states. Challenges include: dependence on oil 
revenues and aid makes the economy vulnerable to external shocks; governing capacity is low; the old guerrilla 
movement Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) dominates politics; and corruption is widespread.52 At the 
same time, some positive features are visible in the economy.  Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia are generating 
foreign direct investments and South Sudan might be eligible for a large soft loan from China. Further inflow of 
investment is predicted to come in construction, manufacturing, power and telecommunication.53       
 
Norfund is actively engaged in South Sudan through a large investment in a hydropower project and as owner 
and manager of a venture capital initiative. Norfund has been instrumental in generating further foreign private 
investment to the hydropower project and it will likely cooperate with entrepreneurs from neighbouring 
countries in some of the venture capital initiatives in the years ahead. This is a sign that Norfund is able to 
deliver on one of its main mandates (trigger additional investments) even in a highly challenging business 
environment such as South Sudan.  
 
Norfund, along with other investors in the country, faces nevertheless a number of profound challenges. Low 
level of business skills means that Norfund needs to take a more hands-on approach than usual to management 
and capacity building in the venture capital initiative. It will need to navigate the challenges that corruption and 
the dominant role of the SPLA network in politics and economics pose. This will likely entail slow progress in 
effectuating investments. However, should Norfund succeed with generating profit on investments done in a 
transparent manner, the positive signalling effects will be substantial. Moreover, South Sudan’s economy will 
likely have high growth rates and considerable business opportunities in sectors such as construction and 
agribusiness in the period ahead. Norfund is well positioned to contribute diversified investment and gain 
considerably from being an early mover.     
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Distorted economy  
 
Fragile states are faced with, as this report has highlighted, a difficult economic 
predicament. Nevertheless there are considerable economic opportunities as countries 
transition from war to peace. Norfund can take on an early mover role and engage in 
the promising new sectors, such as agriculture, or, as it has done in a number of other 
countries, contribute to the strengthening of financial institutions and SME 
development by building microfinance organisations and local investment funds. 
Norfund’s expertise in investing in the developing hydropower installations is also 
particularly relevant in post-conflict settings.  Moreover, its experience in mobilising 
new investors is useful, and Norfund should in particular seek out partnership with 
regional and diaspora investors.  
 
Finally, it is important to reflect on the contributions to domestic tax revenue 
collection that Norfund will likely offer. Restoring the practice of transparent tax 
collection strengthens governance and reduces dependencies on foreign aid or 
extractive industries.  
 
 
Weak institutions  
 
Weak institutions will be a major challenge for Norfund’s work. Inadequate 
government procedures or low capacity among officials that manage the paper work 
associated with foreign investments will slow down Norfund’s activities and make it 
more difficult to succeed. However, engagement by Norfund with the government may 
also be one important contribution by gradually helping to build a better investment 
framework in the country in question. Norfund will need to allow for slow progress, 
but find ways of recognising and communicating that formal dialogue and transparent 
interaction with government authorities may in itself have considerable positive 
development effects in the long run.  
 
The tendency of institutions to be captured by elite interests, as outlined earlier, is a 
particularly serious and difficult challenge. Norfund must ensure that the way it 
engages in fragile states contributes to openness and fair competition. This calls for a 
rigorous and continuous assessment of how Norfund and companies that it invests in 
interacts with government institutions.  Investments and the generation of profit that 
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end up supporting malfunctioning institutions or private elite interests must be avoided 
at all cost. In some cases it may very well be that there are some sectors and areas that 
cannot be invested in, because of the potential negative contributions it may have on a 
country’s institutional set-up.  
 
Overall, Norfund is well position to take the role of being ‘best-in-class’ as a post-
conflict investor. This will entail providing early and diversified capital within 
Norfund’s current strong areas such as SME development, financial institutions and 
renewable energy.  However, given the challenging environment it is important to 
move forward slowly: the way business is done and the positive precedence 
transparent and appropriate business conduct may make, could prove to be as 
important as the actual capital invested or revenues gained.  
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Myanmar: investments in times of transition  
 
Myanmar is undergoing large-scale economic and political change. The government has initiated a process of 
political liberalisation, which has (temporarily) lifted some international economic sanctions on the regime. The 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund has re-established contact with Myanmar and is advising the 
government as it embarks on economic liberalisation. For now though, the economy continues to be dominated 
by state-owned enterprises and large military holding companies.54 Nascent regulation on investment and finance 
has been introduced, but is slow to take effect in a still difficult regulatory environment. In parallel with the 
transition process, upheaval in the Western area Rakhine continues. Majority Buddhists have clashed with 
Rohingya Muslims and triggered a heavy-handed response from the law enforcement. Hostilities also continue 
between the government and Kachin rebels in the north.55 The combination of a wrought and challenging 
democratisation process together with continued unrest in some areas makes continued political instability in the 
years to come likely, even as the government has forged pace with some rebel groups.   
 
Myanmar is facing, from an investor’s perspective, a double challenge. First, it is transiting from a heavily 
government and military regulated and controlled economy towards a free market economy. Second, there are 
profound difficulties with doing business in parts of the country due to ethnic and religious clashes. This implies 
that regulation on foreign investment and financial transactions is likely to be cumbersome and also effectuated 
by inexperienced government bureaucrats. Entrenched elite interests, in particular from the military, will likely 
unduly dominate some of the profitable sectors of the economy. Transparent business transactions may be slow 
and difficult to conduct. Moreover, with tension and spats of violent conflict unfolding in some areas of the 
country launching nation wide economic initiatives will be difficult: extra security measures may be needed in 
some areas and careful consideration must be undertaken so as to prevent the economic engagement adding to 
perceptions of unfairness or contribute to an escalation of conflict.   
 
Norfund has so far taken a cautious approach to Myanmar, but may engage, with other partners, in micro finance 
activities in the period ahead. Opening up credit lines to small-scale entrepreneurs on market terms may prove to 
be an important contribution towards economic liberalisation and inclusive growth. In particular it will help 
mitigate against the old political and military elites reaping a disproportionate share of the economic gains that 
liberalisation brings – as has been the case in so many other transitions in Eurasia and Asia. In any case, Norfund 
will need to be patient as it navigates government bureaucracies and tolerate that progress will be slow. Indeed, 
with the scale of economic reform that Myanmar has ahead of it, a slow pace is advisable, not only for a 
potential Norfund engagement, but also for other investors seeking to do transparent business.56 Finally, if any 
Norfund operations expand to cover all of Myanmar, in-depth considerations of the security and conflict 
situation in specific areas will no doubt be required.    
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Conclusion: rethinking international engagement 
 
This report has assessed the inflow of investment and aid to fragile states and found 
that FDI is often concentrated in a few sectors and tends to come many years after a 
country transits from conflict to peace.  More investment that comes sooner and is 
spread across a more diverse spectrum of sectors is badly needed. Norfund, with its 
mandate to help build profitable and viable enterprises in high-risk settings is 
particularly well positioned to play a positive role. It is paramount however, that 
Norfund recognises the distinct challenges associated with fragile states (instability, 
distorted economy and weak institutions) and adopts operating procedures that can 
mitigate against risks linked to these three features.   
 
While not intended as a survey of how the international community engages with 
fragile states, this report nevertheless points to some key flaws. In particular, the high 
aid to GDP ratios in many countries gives grounds for concern. The situation in 
Afghanistan is particularly dire. A fundamental rethink on involvement in fragile 
states is underway. This will indeed likely pick up speed as the international 
community, with considerable disillusionment, winds down its engagement in 
Afghanistan, which has been one of its biggest reconstruction projects in recent 
history.  
 
A good place to start is to look beyond the large internationally staffed organisations 
towards smaller engines of growth.  The private sector in the form of local, diaspora, 
regional and international investors hold considerable promise and likely further 
untapped potential. Norfund can, by playing its familiar role as catalyst, help shape 
how the private sector is mobilised to create growth and consolidate recovery in fragile 
states. Moreover, triggering business activities that enable the government to increase 
its revenue collection is an indirect and bottom-up way of helping to build better 
governance. It may very well prove that this is a more sustainable way of doing 
statebuilding than unleashing large aid sums for top down capacity building 
programmes, which has been the predominant practice in the past decade.   
 
In this way, even relatively small Norfund investments, if done in the right way and 
with tangible benefits generated for the host country, may help the international 
community alter its engagement with fragile states and improve the chances that 
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international assistance creates the fundament for long-term prosperity rather than 
perennial cycles of aid dependence.    
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Annex 1: international standards  
 
There are a number of voluntary social and environmental standards for company 
conduct and many of these are particularly relevant for companies operating in fragile 
states.  The table below highlights some of the most important frameworks. It builds 
on an overview developed by Jill Shankleman.57  
 
Origin Applicability Objective  Key Elements 
IFC Performance 
Standards on Social and 
Environmental 
Sustainability: July 2006, 
created by IFC in 
consultation with 
companies, recently 
upgraded (2011) 
All IFC projects  Create a comprehensive 
system for identifying and 
managing social and 
environmental risks 
Eight specific standards 
plus requirements for 
consultation and public 
disclosure information  
Equator Principles: June 
2003, initiated by ten 
commercial banks 
Financing for major 
projects carried out in non-
OECD countries  
To apply IFC standards to 
projects financed by 
signatory banks 
A common framework for 
assessing and managing 
environmental and social 
risk in project financing  
Voluntary principles on 
Security and Human 
Rights: December 2000, 
created by US and UK 
governments, oil/mining 
companies and NGOs 
Oil, gas and mining To provide guidance to 
companies on maintaining 
the safety and security of 
their operations while 
respecting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms 
General requirements of 
addressing risk 
assessment; use of security 
contractors; working with 
government security forces  
Principles for good 
international engagement 
in fragile states and 
situations: launched and 
endorsed by OECD DAC 
2007 
International actors 
(including aid 
organisations and 
companies) engaged in 
fragile states  
Help international actors 
foster constructive 
engagement between 
national and international 
stakeholders in countries 
with weak governance and 
conflict  
Ten principles that guide 
action in fragile states, 
including ‘take context as 
starting point’, ‘prioritise 
prevention’ and ‘promote 
non-discriminations’.  
UN Guiding Principles for 
Business and Human 
Rights (adopted by the UN 
Human Rights Council on 
June 2011) 
States and companies, 
particularly relevant for 
companies operating in 
areas where rule of law is 
weak. Applies to 
companies of all sizes and 
structures.  
Provide a blue-print for 
companies on how to 
know and show that they 
are respecting human 
rights.  
Outlines how states and 
companies should act to 
uphold human rights. 
Companies operating in 
areas where violations are 
a risk are asked to do 
‘human rights due 
diligences’, develop a 
human rights policy, 
provide remediation if any 
wrong-doings and 
establish a grievance 
mechanism 
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